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I. INTRODUCTION
1

“The scope of the conspiracy boggles the mind.” But for the
sinister background music, the worldwide vitamin manufacturers’
recent global price fixing conspiracy resembles a James Bond film,
as “[f]or a full decade, top executives at some of the world’s largest
2
drug companies met secretly in hotel suites and at conferences”
throughout Europe and the United States to “carve up the vitamin
3
market” and to fix vitamin prices used in products bought and
4
consumed by all Americans everyday. “When Federal investigators
were closing in, they moved to the homes of high-level European
5
executives.” Meeting clandestinely in places like Paris, France;
Basel, Switzerland; and Lugwigshafen, Germany, these
manufacturers illegally fixed, raised, maintained and stabilized
vitamin prices and allocated global vitamin markets with impunity.
The manufacturers’ conspiracy was “the most pervasive and
6
harmful criminal antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered,” and it
impacted consumers every time they paid for food containing these
manufacturers’ vitamins—from “cereal to orange juice to vitamin
7
pills . . . .”
The vitamin manufacturers targeted our nation’s
consumers as their ultimate victims, since without an end-use
consumer market no demand for their vitamins would have existed,
and their price fixing conspiracy would have been meaningless.

1. David Barboza, Tearing Down the Façade of “Vitamins Inc.,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1999, at C1.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. See also United States v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., No. 99-CR-184-R
(N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999) (Department of Justice Guilty Plea at ¶ 4(b)), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/hoffman.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004);
United States v. BASF Aktiengesellschaft, No. 3-99-CR-200-R (N.D. Tex. May 20,
1999) (BASF AG’s Guilty Plea at ¶ 4(b)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f2400/basf.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004).
5. Barboza, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/6

2

Karon: "Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!" The National Mo
KARON-READY.DOC

2004]

5/20/2004 8:56 PM

TEAR DOWN THAT ILLINOIS BRICK WALL

1353

But the vitamin manufacturers were eventually caught. For
their crimes, two of the three conspiracy leaders, F. Hoffman-La
Roche Ltd. and BASF AG, pleaded guilty and paid fines to the U.S.
8
Department of Justice, while the conspiracy’s third leader, RhonePoulenc, S.A., avoided a criminal fine by cooperating in the DOJ’s
9
investigation.
Afterward, many of the conspiracy’s other
10
participants also pleaded guilty and paid criminal fines.
Customers who purchased vitamins directly from the
manufacturers sued and recovered damages under federal antitrust
11
law, which permits only price fixed products’ direct purchasers to
12
Indirect vitamin
recover overcharges for price fixing violations.
purchasers at multiple levels, such as brokers, distributors and,

8. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, F. Hoffman-La Roche and
BASF Agree to Pay Record Criminal Fines for Participating in International
Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999) (noting F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.’s $500 million
fine and BASF AG’s $225 million fine), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/press_releases/1999/2450.htm (last visited May 15, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Five Executives, One Company
Charged with Price Fixing and Agree to Cooperate in Investigation of Worldwide
Vitamins Price Fixing Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 1999) (noting Lonza AG’s guilty plea
and $10.5 million fine), available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/1999/2266.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, Three Japanese Companies Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay
Criminal Fines, for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (Sept. 9, 1999)
(noting Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd.’s guilty plea and $72 million fine, Eisai
Co. Ltd.’s guilty plea and $40 million fine and Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.’s
guilty plea and $25 million fine), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/1999/3659.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, Canadian Vitamin Company Agrees to Plead Guilty for
Role in International Vitamin Cartel (Sept. 29, 1999) (noting Chinook Group
Ltd.’s guilty plea and $5 million fine), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/3726.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Two German Firms and Two U.S.
Corporations Agree to Plead Guilty to Participating in International Vitamin
Cartels (May 5, 2000) (noting Merck KgaA, Degussa-Huls AG, Nepera, Inc. and
Reilly Industries Inc.’s guilty pleas and combined $33 million fine), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2002/ 4684.htm (last visited
May 15, 2004). Myriad individuals from these companies also pleaded guilty and
paid fines personally.
11. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1285, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17369 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) (order approving settlement agreement with
multiple Vitamins defendants).
12. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (discussed infra). For a
more complete discussion on federal, direct purchaser antitrust litigation, see
Daniel R. Karon, Price Fixing, Market Allocation and Bid Rigging Conspiracies: How to
Counsel Your Clients to Detect Violations and Inform You of Potential Claims, 25 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 241 (2001).
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most of all, consumers, also sued under various states’ antitrust laws
13
and recovered illegal overcharges passed on to them.
But in many states, indirect vitamin purchasers, namely
consumers, have not recovered their overcharges. This is because
either these states’ courts have improperly ruled that consumers
lack antitrust standing under their antitrust laws, or these states’
consumers did not realize they had valid price fixing claims
because indirect purchaser antitrust claims have not traditionally
been pursued there. As a result, these states’ consumers remain
uncompensated for being victimized by the vitamin manufacturers
despite having possessed entirely valid, yet unrealized or wrongly
14
denied, indirect purchaser antitrust claims.
This article will first examine the origin of indirect purchaser
15
antitrust litigation. It will then explain how certain state antitrust
statutes include specific language permitting indirect purchasers
16
standing to pursue antitrust claims.
Next, it will examine how
courts in some states without specific indirect purchaser legislation
have nonetheless interpreted their state antitrust statutes to confer
17
indirect purchaser standing. This article will then demonstrate
how additional states without specific indirect purchaser legislation
also permit standing to indirect purchasers, yet these states’
18
consumers fail to realize these claims’ existence.
Next, it will
explain how some state courts have wrongly denied indirect
purchaser antitrust standing to consumers when, under federal and
state case law, as well as federalism principles, their state antitrust
19
acts actually permit standing. Finally, this article will conclude
that, despite established convention, thirty-nine (and arguably as
many as forty-four) states, plus the District of Columbia, actually
provide indirect purchasers some remedy for price fixing
13. See Master Settlement Agreement 15, Schedule A (Jan. 22, 2001), available
at http://www.vitaminlitigation.com/MASTERSETTLEMENT.pdf (last visited May
15, 2004) (noting the $225,250,000 settlement on behalf of indirect purchasers in
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
West Virginia and Wisconsin as states and areas where indirect purchasers have
recovered for illegal overcharges resulting from the defendants’ conspiracy).
14. Unfortunately, the statutes of limitations have run on all these states’
antitrust acts.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Parts V, VI.
19. See infra Part VII.
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20

II. FEDERAL LAW PERMITS STATES TO PROTECT
INDIRECT PURCHASERS
21

Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits any
agreement among competitors to restrain trade, including
agreements to fix prices and allocate markets. The Clayton Act of
1914 gives the U.S. district courts jurisdiction to “prevent and
22
restrain violations of [the Sherman Act].” Until 1977, both direct
and indirect purchasers were permitted to sue under the Clayton
23
Act for Sherman Act violations.
In 1968, however, indirect
purchaser standing began to erode. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
24
Shoe Machinery Corp., a shoe-making machinery manufacturer
defended a monopoly claim on the basis that the plaintiff, a shoe
manufacturer that bought its machinery, had passed on the entire
monopoly overcharge to the plaintiff’s customers; as a result, the
25
plaintiff had not been injured. The United States Supreme Court
ultimately held an antitrust defendant could not defend a damages
suit on the basis that the plaintiff had shifted the cost of the
26
defendant’s wrongdoing to the plaintiff’s customers.
While Hanover Shoe foreclosed pass-on damages’ “defensive
use” in antitrust cases, their “offensive use” was considered ten
27
years later in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. In Illinois Brick, plaintiffs
brought suit against concrete block manufacturers alleging
defendants “had engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix
the prices of concrete block in violation of section 1 of the
28
Sherman Act.” But consistent with (yet the reverse of) its Hanover
Shoe ruling, the Court held indirect purchasers could not maintain
20. See infra Part VIII.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
22. Id. § 4.
23. Before Illinois Brick, six of the seven federal courts of appeals that
considered this issue held indirect purchasers could recover damages for antitrust
violations. See, e.g., In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir.
1973); W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
24. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
25. Id. at 487-88.
26. Id. at 494.
27. 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977) (“Having decided [in Hanover Shoe] that in
general a pass-on theory may not be used defensively by an antitrust violator
against a direct purchaser plaintiff, we must now decide whether that theory may
be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff against an alleged violator.”).
28. Id. at 726-27.
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an action for a Sherman Act violation when alleging that
29
defendants’ illegal overcharges had been passed on to them. The
Court’s main bases for its decision were that lawsuits involving both
direct and indirect purchasers might create multiple liability risks
30
for defendants
and that such actions would be overly
31
complicated.
With this ruling, indirect purchasers could no
longer maintain federal lawsuits for damages caused by Sherman
32
Act violations.
In reaching its result, the majority, in an opinion written by
Justice White, declined to follow the U.S. Justice Department,
which had urged the door be left open for indirect purchaser
33
suits.
Three dissenting Justices agreed with the Justice
Department. Justice Brennan wrote that the majority had ignored
antitrust law’s fundamental policy to compensate victims:
[Hanover Shoe’s] same policies of insuring the continued
effectiveness of the treble-damages action and preventing
wrongdoers from retaining the spoils of their misdeeds
favor allowing indirect purchasers to prove that
34
overcharges were passed on to them.
Lack of precision in apportioning damages between direct
and indirect purchasers is thus plainly not a convincing
reason for denying indirect purchasers an opportunity to
prove their injuries and damages. Moreover, from the
deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages
are paid, so long as someone redresses the violation.
Antitrust violators are equally deterred whether the
29. Id. at 727-28.
30. Id. at 730.
31. Id. at 731-32. The Court also added its belief that “the antitrust laws will
be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge
in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected
by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it.” Id.
at 735.
32. Although this article describes the issue as one relating to “standing,”
debate exists as to whether Illinois Brick is concerned with standing or the
definition of “injury.” As the Illinois Brick Court noted, who has standing and who
has sustained injury are “analytically distinct,” and Illinois Brick’s precise holding
was that the direct purchaser, not the indirect purchaser, was the one “injured” for
purposes of federal antitrust law. Id. at 728 n.7. While this analytical distinction
exists, these two concepts merge for practical purposes, and the word “standing” is
generally used to denote a person who has sustained an injury sufficient to give
rise to an actionable Clayton Act claim for a Sherman Act violation.
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, passim, Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404).
34. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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judgments against them are in favor of direct or indirect
35
purchasers. Hanover Shoe said as much.
Justice Blackmun, another dissenter, wrote that the Court’s
opinion adopted “a wooden approach . . . entirely inadequate when
considered in the light of the objectives of the Sherman and
36
Clayton Acts.”
Illinois Brick immediately generated major controversy as the
Court’s concerns about multiple liability and overly complex
litigation proved unfounded. Courts realized they were “fully
capable of ensuring antitrust defendants are not forced to pay
more in damages than amounts to which the injured parties are
37
entitled.” They noted the “absence of cases in which . . . court[s
38
were] faced with the impossible task of apportioning damages,”
and that “[t]here [were] few, if any, reported instances of a
defendant paying treble damages to two different classes of
39
purchasers based on a single antitrust violation.” Courts further
recognized “[c]omplexity [was] not a foreign concept in the world
40
of antitrust”
and “[t]he day [was] long past when courts . . .
[would] deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of
41
procedural difficulties or problems of apportioning damages.”
Even Congress recognized the Court’s overreaction to the
potential for complexity:
The House Report on H.R. 11942 . . . concluded that the
Court had overstated the problem of complexity in Illinois
Brick. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on S.
1874, acknowledged the difficulty of proving pass-on but
35. Id. at 759-60.
36. Id. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 449-50 (Iowa 2002)
[hereinafter Comes]; see also Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter Hyde] (“We find that a slight risk of multiple liability is
greatly outweighed by the benefit of advancing the aforementioned policies of
[North Carolina’s Antitrust Act].”).
38. Comes, supra note 37, at 451.
39. Id. at 449 (quoting Hyde, 473 S.E.2d at 687).
40. Id. at 451.
41. Id. Accord Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 109 (Ariz.
2003) [hereinafter Bunker’s] (noting “courts can manage the complexity of
indirect purchaser recovery in antitrust cases . . . .”). Many commentators have
also criticized Illinois Brick for its bad public policy. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth
Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing,
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 passim (2001); Kevin J. O’Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall
Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34, 34-35, 37-38 (2001); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 passim (1999).
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concluded that this difficulty did not justify ignoring the
important rights of indirect purchasers. The Senate
Committee also concluded that the courts or the
legislature could solve any procedural and judicial
management problems. In its report on the RodinoKennedy bill, the Senate Committee again rejected the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that apportioning damages
between plaintiffs was too complex a task for courts to
handle, based on their performance in the period
between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The Committee
observed that judicial functions in a wide variety of cases
outside the antitrust area were no less complex than those
42
inherent in pass-on cases.
But despite its controversy, the Illinois Brick ruling never
purported to limit applying state antitrust laws to parties indirectly
injured by antitrust violations. The United States Supreme Court
expressed this proposition twelve years later in California v. ARC
43
America Corp. where, in another opinion written by Justice White,
the Court unanimously held that states had the right to enact and
enforce laws permitting indirect purchasers to recover for antitrust
44
violations. As amici curiae, thirty-eight state attorneys general also
supported this position that state law should fill in the indirect
45
purchaser void.
In ARC America, plaintiffs, four states, were indirect purchasers
46
of cement and concrete used for state projects. Plaintiffs filed
antitrust actions involving this cement and concrete, in part, under
their respective state antitrust statutes, seeking damages for
47
defendants’ price fixing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
the four state antitrust laws were preempted because they

42. Cynthia Urda Kassis, The Indirect Purchaser’s Right to Sue Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1087,
1116 (1983).
43. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
44. Id. at 105-06; see also Comes, supra note 37, at 444 (“[ARC America] held
nothing in the Sherman Act or in Illinois Brick prevents the states from allowing
indirect purchasers to bring antitrust actions, even if this results in multiple
recoveries.”) (footnote omitted).
45. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 95; see also Brief of Thirty-Five States and the District
of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, State of California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1987) (No. 87-1862).
46. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 96.
47. Id. at 98. (Plaintiffs’ “claims under these state indirect purchaser statutes
are the focus of this case.”).
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48

conflicted with Illinois Brick’s Sherman Act interpretation.
As a starting point, the Court noted Congress has the authority
49
to preempt state law. If Congress has not expressly preempted an
area of state law, it can impliedly do so under two circumstances:
First, when Congress intends that federal law occupy a
given field, state law in that field is pre-empted. Second,
even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is
nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible, or when the state law “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
50
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
The Court then instructed that for the defendants to
successfully argue that federal law had preempted the states’
indirect purchaser laws (meaning only direct purchasers could sue
for antitrust violations), they had to first overcome the
presumption against finding state law preemption in areas
traditionally regulated by the states:
When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied
by the States, “we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.” Given the long
history of state common-law and statutory remedies
against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is
plain that this is an area traditionally regulated by the
51
States.
The Court further highlighted that “[a]t the time of the
enactment of the Sherman Act, 21 States had already adopted their
own antitrust laws,” and that “the Sherman Act itself, in the words
of Senator Sherman, ‘[did] not announce a new principle of law,
but applie[d] old and well recognized principles of the common
law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal
52
Government.’”
State indirect purchaser statutes, the Court explained, “are
consistent with the broad purposes of the federal antitrust laws:
48. In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir.
1987).
49. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 100.
50. Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 101 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at n.4.
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deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation
53
of victims of that conduct,” and “nothing in Illinois Brick suggests
that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to
allow indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust
54
laws.” The Court further explained, “it is plain that this is an area
55
traditionally regulated by the States,” and that Illinois Brick was
limited to construing federal, not state, law’s application:
When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision
construing the federal antitrust laws, not a decision
defining the interrelationship between the federal and
state antitrust laws. The congressional purposes on which
Illinois Brick was based provide no support for a finding
that state indirect purchaser statutes are pre-empted by
56
federal law.
The Court concluded, “Congress intended the federal
antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust
57
remedies,” and “the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
58
state indirect purchaser statutes [were] pre-empted.” With ARC
America it was finally determined that indirect purchasers were not
proscribed from pursuing price fixing claims under state antitrust
laws.
III. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT TOWARD INDIRECT
PURCHASER STANDING
As one court recently commented:
[I]t is one thing to consider the congressional policies
identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is
something altogether different, and in our view
inappropriate, to consider them as defining what federal
59
law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.
53. Id. at 102; see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
123 F.3d 599, 611 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law . . . is a field in which Congress
has not sought to replace state with federal law.”) (citation omitted).
54. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 103.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 102.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No. M2000-1850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn.
Ct. App. LEXIS 539, at *80 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Sherwood] (emphasis
added); see also Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (“[I]ssues such as whether deterrence, compensation, or efficient
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Not surprisingly, then, in Illinois Brick’s wake, several states
passed so-called Illinois Brick “repealer statutes” explicitly permitting
damage actions by or on behalf of indirect purchasers, including
ultimate consumers. Presently, twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia’s antitrust acts contain repealer statutes permitting
either their states’ consumers or attorneys general as parens patriae
60
to pursue indirect purchaser price fixing claims. Washington’s
consumer fraud act permits its attorney general to sue for
61
consumers’ price fixing damages as parens patriae,
and
62
63
64
65
66
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Vermont, Florida and New Jersey
judicial administration should be promoted by antitrust laws and whether and to
what extent these goals can or should be harmonized are fundamental policy
decisions for the legislature of each state.”) (internal footnote omitted).
60. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577 (Michie 2003)
(authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-315
(Michie 2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16750 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111 (2003) (authorizing
attorney general action as parens patriae); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (2003); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480-13 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 48-113 (2003); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/7 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-161 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104 (West 2003); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 11-209 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens
patriae); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2003); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-821 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT.
598A.160 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-1-3 (Michie 2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 340 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-08 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
646.780 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-36-12 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (Michie 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2465 (2003); W. VA.
CODE ST. R. §§ 142-9-1, 142-9-2 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 133.18 (2003).
Moreover, in FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc. (Mylan II), 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11
(D.D.C. 1999), Judge Thomas Hogan, the judge who presided over In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litigation, ruled that Illinois Brick did not preclude the Alaska, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia attorneys general
from seeking restitution or damages resulting from price fixing on behalf of
consumers under these states’ consumer protection or unfair trade practices
statutes. Judge Hogan also held that Washington’s damages claim for indirect
purchasers was limited to state governmental entity purchasers. Id. passim.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (2003); see also Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 938
P.2d 842, 847 (1997) (“If direct purchasers decide not to sue, the indirect
purchaser is not entirely without a remedy. While a private plaintiff must ‘be
injured in his or her business or property’ in order to bring any suit under the Act,
this requirement does not exist in the section of the Act that enables actions by the
attorney general.”).
62. Ciardi v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 762 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Mass. 2002).
63. Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, [7], No. S-01-1325, 2004 Neb.
LEXIS 43, *22 (2004).
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courts have ruled indirect purchasers can pursue damages claims
for antitrust violations under their states’ consumer protection
statutes. And importantly, courts in four non-repealer states,
67
68
69
70
Arizona, Iowa, North Carolina and Tennessee, have ruled
indirect purchasers have standing to pursue damage claims under
71
their states’ antitrust statutes.
All told, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, which
represent about seventy percent of our nation’s population,
72
provide some claim for indirect purchasers. This leaves seventeen
states: eight where courts have specifically ruled, albeit wrongly,
73
against indirect purchaser standing; and nine where the issue has
not yet been decided. Of the latter nine states, two do not have
64. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d 9, 18-20 (Vt. 2002) (noting indirect
purchasers can also sue under Vermont’s antitrust statute).
65. Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
66. Cement Masons Local Union No. 699 v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 431-99, slip
op. at 10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2000) (order denying motion to dismiss
consumer fraud claim on behalf of consumer indirect purchasers). But see Wilson
v. General Motors Corp., No. L-1287-03, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003)
(order dismissing plaintiff’s consumer fraud claim for indirect purchaser price
fixing injury); Kieffer v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. BER-L-365-99-EM, 1999 WL
1567726 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (letter opinion holding indirect purchasers
lack standing under New Jersey’s antitrust and consumer fraud acts).
67. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 110.
68. Comes, supra note 37, at 451.
69. Hyde, supra note 37, at 688.
70. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *115; Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 03AO19509-CV-00307, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184, at *19 (Mar. 27, 1996).
71. Consumers have also sought to recover their antitrust overcharges by
alleging defendants’ unjust enrichment. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying defendants’ motion to
dismiss consumers’ class action unjust enrichment claims for overcharges under
various states’ laws); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. C34355-L,
slip op. at 2 (Law Court Sullivan Cty., Kingsport, Tenn. July 15, 2002)
(“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is overruled and denied with respect to Plaintiffs’
[sic] claim and cause of action on the theory of unjust enrichment under
Tennessee law.”).
72. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 35. For additional discussion on the number
of indirect states, see Thomas Greene, Kevin O’Connor & Robert L. Hubbard,
State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, 1252 PLI/CORP. 1129, 1152-1156 (2001).
73. See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2002); Berghausen v.
Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Arnold v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 2000-CA-002144-MR, 2001 WL 1835377 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001); Duvall v.
Silvers, Asher, Sher & McLaren, M.D.’s, Neurology, P.C., 998 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999); Minuteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 795 A.2d 833 (N.H. 2002));
Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 802 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) [hereinafter
Johnson]; Major v. Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. No. 3 2002);
Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995).
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74

antitrust acts and one state’s antitrust act does not apply to price
75
76
fixing. The remaining six non-repealer states, however, actually
permit indirect purchaser antitrust claims, yet the states’ consumers
have to date failed to recognize these claims’ existence and have
77
failed to assert their rights to pursue them.
IV. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT PERMIT INDIRECT PURCHASERS TO
PURSUE PRICE FIXING CASES UNDER THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS
Just because a state legislature has not enacted specific
“repealer legislation” does not mean its consumers cannot pursue
antitrust cases for damages caused by price fixing. This is, in part,
because many state antitrust laws already provide indirect
purchasers standing even absent specific repealer legislation.
A. Iowa: Comes v. Microsoft Corp.
78

In Comes v. Microsoft Corp., “[a] group of consumers filed suit
alleging Microsoft maintained or used a monopoly in conjunction
with its Windows 98 operating system for the purpose of excluding
competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in
79
violation of the Iowa Competition Law [its antitrust act].” On
74. Georgia and Pennsylvania.
75. Wyoming’s antitrust laws provide private remedies for only a few civil
offenses, which do not include price fixing. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-114
(Michie 2003).
76. Louisiana, South Carolina, Montana, Utah, Virginia and Delaware.
77. However, in In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, 205 F.R.D.
369, 374 (D.D.C. 2002), which involved attorneys general, consumers, and the
FTC’s lawsuits against defendant drug manufacturers for violating various federal
and state antitrust laws by monopolizing the markets for the generic anti-anxiety
drugs Lorazepam and Clorazepate, the court actually granted final class action
settlement approval to all plaintiffs’ claims. The court explained that consumers
“in twenty states—Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin . . . have specific indirect purchaser statutes or case
law permitting private parties to sue” and approved indirect purchasers’ claims in
the “thirty-one other states—Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming” as well. Id. The court further approved all
fifty states’ attorneys general settlements, pursuant to the attorneys general’s parens
patriae authority to pursue state consumer antitrust claims. Id. at 386-88.
78. Comes, supra note 37.
79. Id. at 441.
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appeal, “[t]he only issue [was] whether the United States Supreme
Court case, Illinois Brick, should be followed in interpreting the
80
Iowa Competition Law.” The consumer-plaintiffs urged the court
to find that federal law did not control Iowa’s antitrust law and that
81
indirect purchasers could sue under it.
As a starting point, the Iowa Supreme Court noted the “very
broad category of persons [permitted] to maintain a suit in [Iowa]
state courts for damages resulting from anticompetitive conduct.
‘[A] person who is injured . . . by conduct prohibited under this
chapter may bring suit to: . . . [r]ecover actual damages resulting
82
from conduct prohibited under this chapter.’”
The court
83
believed Iowa’s antitrust statute was “clear on its face,” and the
words “a person” permitted indirect purchasers to sue for
violations:
This statute does not restrict the class of persons who may
bring suit under the Iowa Competition Law. Nothing in
the statute says in order to seek redress for antitrust
violations a purchaser must be directly injured. The
legislature did not specifically limit standing to direct
purchasers, but instead it simply authorized “[a] person
who is injured” to sue. Legislative intent is determined by
what the legislature said, not by what it did not say or
might have said. Therefore, we do not regard our
legislature’s failure to explicitly authorize indirect
purchasers to maintain a suit for antitrust violations as an
expression of its agreement with Illinois Brick. Given the
clear, broad language of the state antitrust law, we
conclude the Iowa Competition Law creates a cause of
action for all consumers, regardless of one’s technical
84
status as a direct or indirect purchaser.
Despite the statute’s plain meaning, Microsoft argued that
Iowa’s Competition Law did not permit indirect purchasers redress
because Iowa’s legislature had “mandated that the Iowa
Competition Law shall be construed to complement federal
law . . . . Therefore, . . . Iowa [was] bound by the federal law
85
To support this argument, Microsoft
[namely Illinois Brick].”

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 442.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also IOWA CODE § 553.12 (2003).
Comes, supra note 37, at 445.
Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 445-46.
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relied on the Iowa Competition Law’s “harmonization” clause,
which instructs:
This chapter shall be construed to complement and be
harmonized with the applied laws of the United States
which have the same or similar purpose as this chapter.
This construction shall not be made in such a way as to
constitute a delegation of state authority to the federal
government, but shall be made to achieve uniform
application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of
86
economic activity and monopolistic practices.
But the court found that this provision did not require Iowa
courts to interpret Iowa’s Competition Law the same way federal
87
courts have interpreted federal law. The court explained the issue
was not preemption, in that “Congress intended federal antitrust
88
laws to supplement, not displace state antitrust remedies.”
Because Illinois Brick construed only federal antitrust law, “it did not
define the connection, if any, between federal and state antitrust
89
laws.”
The court instructed instead that “the ‘concept of
federalism assumes power, and duty, of independence in
90
interpreting [a state’s] own organic law.’” Because federal law did
not preempt it, the court construed the Iowa Competition Law to
91
encourage antitrust law’s primary goal.
In construing the Competition Law’s harmonization clause,
the court did not believe the clause was aimed at defining who
could sue under the Competition Law, but was instead intended to
achieve the state and federal laws’ uniform application prohibiting
monopolistic practices:
The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is
to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses
will know what is acceptable conduct and what is not
acceptable conduct.
To achieve this uniformity or
predictability, we are not required to define who may sue
in our state courts in the same way federal courts have
defined who may maintain an action in federal court.
Rather, our guiding principle in interpreting the Iowa

86. Id. at 446; see also IOWA CODE § 553.2 (2003).
87. Comes, supra note 37, at 446.
88. Id. (citing Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 967
(E.D. Wis. 1998)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Pool v. Super. Ct., 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984)).
91. Id.
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Competition Law is to do so in such way as to prohibit
“restraints of economic activity and monopolistic
conduct.”
Harmonizing our construction and
interpretation of state law as to what conduct is governed
92
by the law satisfies the harmonization provision.
The court also acknowledged the consistency between the
policies underlying Iowa’s Competition Law and federal antitrust
law:
The United States Supreme Court [in ARC America] has
held that two statutes, both of which prohibit
anticompetitive conduct, are not inconsistent merely
because one allows indirect purchasers to sue for damages
while the other does not. The federal antitrust statute
shows Congress’ concern with the protection of
competition, not competitors.
The goal of federal
antitrust law is to prohibit restraint of economic activity
and monopolistic practices.
Our state antitrust law
promotes the same consumer protection policies as does
federal antitrust law by “assuring customers the benefits of
price competition.” In order for us to agree with
Microsoft that the harmonization statute requires us to
prohibit suits by indirect consumers, we must accept the
fact that real victims—those who purchase goods and pay
the overcharge—cannot recover. This result would
overwhelmingly defeat the purpose of the Iowa
Competition Law. Consumers in this state are best
protected by permitting all injured purchasers to bring
93
suit against those who violate our antitrust laws.
Importantly, the court also considered the legislature’s
purpose and intent at the time the Iowa Competition Law was
enacted:
The Iowa legislature passed the current Iowa Competition
Law one year before the decision in Illinois Brick.
Consequently, it was impossible for the legislature to have
adopted a judicial construction which did not exist at that
time. The legislature did not have the opportunity to
discuss Illinois Brick and accept or reject its law before
94
passing the Iowa Competition Law.
Further, because Iowa “took its cues” from federal law when

92.
93.
94.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 447 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
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creating its Competition Law, it was significant that “[p]rior to
Illinois Brick, most federal courts construed section four of the
95
Clayton Act to allow suits by indirect purchasers,” and that “even
the United States Supreme Court prior to Illinois Brick consistently
recognized Congress’ intent in enacting section four of the Clayton
96
Act was to protect all victims of antitrust infringements.”
Mindful of this chronology, the court appreciated that
“[w]hen the Iowa legislature enacted the Iowa Competition Law, it
did so considering the federal law prior to Illinois Brick, which
97
allowed indirect purchasers to bring antitrust suits.” The federal
law’s status before Illinois Brick formed still further support for the
court’s conclusion that “the Iowa legislature intended indirect
98
purchasers to have standing under the Iowa Competition Law.”
Finally, the court realized the Illinois Brick Court was primarily
concerned with policy considerations such as multiple liability and
litigation complexity that had “not materialized,” and which had
99
“little, if any, applicability to antitrust suits in state court.” The
court observed “few, if any, reported instances of a defendant
paying treble damages to two different classes of purchasers based
100
on a single antitrust violation,” and that “courts [were] fully
capable of ensuring antitrust defendants are not forced to pay
more in damages than amounts to which the injured parties are
101
entitled.”
The court likewise explained “[c]omplexity is not a foreign
95. Id.
96. Id. at 447-48 (citing Kassis, supra note 42, at 1098); see also Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1958) (finding that antitrust laws
protected victims, as well as the public, and courts should not burden private
litigants with additional requirements in a case in which plaintiff sued under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging defendants had conspired to monopolize
professional football); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (finding that the statute did not confine its protection to
consumers, purchasers, competitors, or sellers, but that its terms and coverage
were comprehensive, “protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices” in case where sugar beet growers sued sugar refiners and distributors
under the Sherman Act for price fixing); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946) (in Sherman and Clayton Acts claim for monopolistic
practices involving exhibiting motion pictures, explaining that to require plaintiffs
to demonstrate specific damages where defendants have made it difficult to do so
would induce more grievous wrongdoing).
97. Comes, supra note 37, at 448.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 449.
100. Id. (quoting Hyde, supra note 37, at 685).
101. Id. at 449-50 (citing Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 1130).
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102

concept in the world of antitrust,”
and “there [was] an absence
of cases in which [courts had been] faced with the impossible task
103
of apportioning damages.”
The court acknowledged even
Congress’ belief that the Illinois Brick Court had overstated the
104
potential for complex litigation. “We should not defeat the ends
105
of justice simply because the litigation may be complicated,”
reasoned the court, and difficulty proving pass-on damages did not
justify ignoring indirect purchasers’ rights since courts can typically
resolve any management problems that might arise during
106
litigation.
With these considerations in mind, as well as the
Illinois Brick Court’s concession that allowing indirect purchaser
suits ultimately resulted in no redress for the indirect purchaser
107
actually injured by paying an overcharge, the Comes court held
Iowa’s “antitrust law contemplate[d] all injured consumers [were]
108
authorized to bring suit to enforce [Iowa’s] antitrust laws,” and
109
the class had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
B. Arizona: Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC
110

Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC involved two consolidated
class action antitrust cases brought by indirect purchasers against
111
various flat glass manufacturers and tobacco manufacturers. The
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed both trial courts’ orders
112
dismissing the indirect purchasers’ antitrust claims,
and the
Arizona Supreme Court “granted Defendants’ petitions for review
to resolve whether indirect purchasers may sue under the Arizona
113
Antitrust Act.”

102. Comes, supra note 37, at 451.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Kassis, supra note 42, at 1116 (“The House Report on H.R.
11942, . . . concluded that the Court had overstated the problem of complexity in
Illinois Brick[, and t]he Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on S. 1874,
acknowledged the difficulty of proving pass-on but concluded that this difficulty
did not justify ignoring the important rights of indirect purchasers.”)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 450 (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746).
108. Id. at 451.
109. Id.
110. 75 P.3d 99 (Ariz. 2003).
111. Id. at 101.
112. Id.; see also Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 1130; Gray v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
Civ A. C2000078, slip op. (Ariz. Feb. 28, 2001).
113. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102.
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The court began its discussion by noting the “case turn[ed]
upon the interpretation of a provision of the Arizona Antitrust Act
114
that permits a ‘person’ to sue to redress an antitrust injury.”
115
Considering the Act’s “plain language,” the court “define[d]
116
‘person’ as including ‘an individual’ ” and observed “[n]othing in
this language restrict[ed] the right of action to direct purchasers
injured by violations of the Arizona Antitrust Act or preclude[d]
117
indirect purchasers from suing.”
“[B]y defining the term
‘person’ to include an ‘individual,’ ” explained the court, “the
legislature signaled its intent to allow indirect purchasers to sue,
118
because individuals are rarely direct purchasers.”
Defendants, however, argued strict adherence to Illinois Brick
119
precluded plaintiffs from pursuing their antitrust claims. But the
court disagreed, noting first that Arizona’s Antitrust Act was
enacted “three years before Illinois Brick was decided,” and that
Arizona courts are instructed that they “may use as a guide
interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal
120
antitrust statutes.”
Employing the Arizona Antitrust Act’s liberal “federal
121
guidance clause,” the court further disagreed that the Arizona
Legislature had “direct[ed] the court to follow the Supreme
122
Court’s holding in Illinois Brick.”
The court did “not read the
federal guidance clause as manifesting a legislative intent to rigidly
follow federal precedent on every issue of antitrust law regardless of
whether differing concerns and interests exist in the state and
123
federal systems.”
Instead, the word “may” made applying Illinois
124
Brick “permissive rather than mandatory.”
The court reiterated
that the guidance clause “evince[d] no specific legislative intent to
prohibit indirect purchaser actions because the guidance clause
was [also] enacted before Illinois Brick was decided,” and the only
“specific case law regarding indirect purchasers [the legislature
could have had] in mind when it included the guidance clause . . .
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1408 (2003).
Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102.
Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1401).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1412 (2003).
Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102.
Id.
Id. at 102-03.
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would have been . . . [cases] permitting indirect purchaser suits
[because that] was the prevailing rule nationwide before the Court
125
decided Illinois Brick.”
The court further noted the Arizona Attorney General had
historically interpreted the Act as providing indirect purchaser
claims and had “brought several actions on behalf of the state and
126
its agencies for harm incurred as an indirect purchaser.”
These
actions, the court believed, “reflect[ed] the state policy of
accepting the benefits of indirect purchaser lawsuits and protecting
127
Arizona taxpayers in their role as indirect purchasers.”
Citing Comes, the court agreed the guidance clause’s goal was
“uniformity in the standard of conduct required, [and] not
necessarily in procedural matters such as who may bring an action
128
for injuries caused by violations of the standard of conduct.” The
court also confirmed that ARC America held “allowing state laws to
protect indirect purchasers would not interfere with the federal
129
antitrust policy examined in Illinois Brick . . . .”
The defendants next suggested that allowing indirect
130
purchaser lawsuits was to “involve the court in ‘judicial activism’ ”
and argued the only valid way to avoid applying Illinois Brick was by
131
specific repealer statute.
But the court did “not view [its]
rejection of Illinois Brick as judicial activism because the legislature
[had] specifically granted the right of action to indirect purchasers
132
in § 44-1408 [of the Arizona Antitrust Act].”
Accordingly, the
court “simply reject[ed a] judicial interpretation of the parallel
federal act that would prohibit suits by indirect purchasers despite
133
the statutory language granting such a right of action,”
explaining:
The Arizona statute broadly grants a right of action to any
“person” injured in business or property by the anticompetitive acts of another. The Plaintiffs certainly fall
within the definition of persons. The complaints, which
must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss,

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
Id. at 103 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97-98 (1989)).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added).
Id. at 107.
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allege that the Defendants’ illegal activity injured them in
their business or property. So why do the Plaintiffs not
have a right of action according to Defendants? Because
the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick judicially limited the
comparable federal statute. In the absence of the federal
guidance clause, Arizona’s statutory language would
plainly include indirect purchasers. Viewed against this
background, Illinois Brick repealer statutes do not expand
the right-of-action statutes, they simply reject a judicially
imposed limitation on the right to sue originally granted
by statute. By refusing to construe the federal guidance
clause as requiring that Arizona courts follow Illinois
Brick’s limitation on the scope of the right of action
granted by the legislature, the court is simply choosing to
follow the expressed legislative intent that persons injured in their
business or property by anti-competitive activity have a right of
action. The court defers to the legislature, not the federal
134
courts, to create exceptions to the rule.
The defendants also sought to “use the Illinois Brick repealer
statutes as the standard for uniformity, asserting that uniformity
mandate[d] that the court leave it to the legislature to depart from
135
The court believed this argument “elevate[d] form
federal law.”
136
over substance,” and instead explained that “[t]he law in most of
the states that have considered the issue provides that indirect
137
purchasers may bring a private action,” and “[t]he importance of
uniformity [lay] in the rule of law, not in how that law came into
138
effect.”
Finally, considering defendants’ “multiple liability” argument,
the court believed the multiple liability risk was one the trial courts
139
were competent to handle and that the courts were in the best
140
position to solve the double-recovery problem.
As for
“complexity,” the court explained “[t]he complexity of proving
damages through multiple levels of sales [was] a daunting task, but
141
one to which [its] courts [were] equal,” and it “[could not]
say . . . that damages to indirect purchasers [were] too speculative
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108.
Id.
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because they [were] difficult to measure and prove.”
Instead,
history indicated that courts can manage complex indirect
143
purchaser recovery in antitrust cases, and neither the court nor
144
defendants could cite cases involving unresolvable complexity.
The court explained “recent developments in multistate litigation
show[ed] that plaintiffs may be able to produce satisfactory proof
145
of damages,” and “[a]llowing the courts to attempt to achieve
justice in the antitrust realm comport[ed] with the longstanding
policy of this state to protect consumers and deter anti-competitive
146
behavior.”
Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate courts’ decisions
and remanded both cases to their respective trial courts for further
147
proceedings.
C. Tennessee: Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp.
148

Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp. involved the identical consumer
claim as Comes. This time, Microsoft argued indirect purchasers
had no claim under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act
149
(Tennessee’s antitrust act).
The court first considered Illinois Brick and noted its
application to antitrust injury and standing under federal antitrust
law:

142. Id. (citing Edmund H. Mantell, Denial of a Forum to Indirect-Purchaser
Victims of Price Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2
PACE L. REV. 153, 204-10 (1982) (presenting formula for calculating damages and
arguing the suggested difficulties for such calculations are exaggerated); Robert
G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 315 (1979) (suggesting
“reasonable estimation of passing on which will closely approximate the truth in
the majority of cases requires no mystical powers or elaborate, extensive economic
analysis”)). The In re Vitamins Defendants’ Indirect Purchaser Master Settlement
Agreement also demonstrates damages are not too complex to compute and
allocate.
143. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 109.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 N.W.2d 668, 679 (S.D.
2003) (cited by Bunker’s, where the court noted virtually all courts considering
indirect purchasers’ claims against Microsoft have upheld class certification based
on plaintiffs’ testimony regarding proving pass-on damages).
146. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 110.
147. Id.
148. No. M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 31, 2003).
149. Id. at *2.
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It is one thing to consider the congressional policies
identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is
something altogether different, and in our view
inappropriate, to consider them as defining what federal
150
law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.
The court acknowledged Tennessee had not adopted an
Illinois Brick repealer statute, and that the Tennessee General
151
The
Assembly had sought to pass such legislation three times.
court also recognized that “proposed legislation, not enacted,
ha[d] no consequence whatever upon the interpretation of an
152
existing statute.”
The court then turned its attention to the Act’s language and
the broad class of claimants to whom it applied: “[T]he law
provides a civil remedy to ‘[a]ny person who is injured or damaged
153
by such arrangement.’ ”
Relying partly on Comes, the court took
the term “any person” to “reflect[] an intent to protect and provide
154
a remedy to individuals who are the ultimate consumers.”
As further support for its conclusion, the court considered the
Sherman and Tennessee Acts’ purposes:
While the purpose of the federal antitrust statutes is to
protect competition and commerce, the state act’s
purposes are to protect both commerce and the
consuming public. It is clear that the legislature intended
that consumers, or ultimate purchasers, of goods be
provided a remedy for any injury, including higher prices,
sustained due to the prohibited anticompetitive conduct.
There is no basis to presume that the legislature intended
to protect only those consumers who purchased directly
from the violator. There is clear intent to the contrary.
We hold that indirect purchasers are “persons” who may
bring an action for an injury caused by violation of the
155
TTPA.
150. Id. at *82.
151. Id. at *86-87.
152. Id. at *87; see also Jo Ann Forman, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins.,
Inc., 13 S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (indicating that the court was
bound by Tennessee case law concerning the definition of the term “article” in the
TTPA and was not permitted to broaden this term to cover plaintiffs’ claim despite
three failed legislative attempts to broaden it).
153. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *98 (emphasis added) (quoting TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-106 (2003)).
154. Id. at *98.
155. Id. at *99.
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The court also “weighed the policy concerns raised by the
156
agreeing (i) “that allowing indirect
Court in Illinois Brick,”
purchasers to sue would not pose a risk of deterring lawsuits
157
because of apportionment of recovery”
because indirect
purchasers would sue under state antitrust laws in state court and
direct purchasers would sue under federal antitrust laws in federal
158
court, and (ii) that courts found “concerns over complexity and
apportionment less worrisome or inapplicable in the cases before
them and were sympathetic to the arguments that indirect
159
purchasers usually suffer the real loss.”
Accordingly, and consistent with its earlier Blake v. Abbott
160
Laboratories, Inc.
ruling, where the court also held indirect
purchasers had standing to sue for damages under the Tennessee
161
Antitrust Act, the court “conclude[d] that indirect purchasers
such as Plaintiffs herein [could] sue for injury caused them by
162
violation of the TTPA.”
D. North Carolina: Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
163

plaintiffs, who were
In Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,
indirect purchasers from defendants, filed a class action alleging
defendants had violated North Carolina’s antitrust laws by fixing
164
infant formula wholesale prices.
According to the North
Carolina Antitrust Act:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person,
firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or
injured by reason of any act or thing . . . in violation of the
provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
165
corporation so injured shall have a right of action . . . .
Defendants argued that although the Act applied to “persons,”
the “General Assembly somehow intended to exclude a large class
156. Id. at *101.
157. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 31.
158. One need merely observe the federal-direct purchaser Vitamins case and
myriad state-indirect purchaser Vitamins cases to see this concept demonstrated.
See supra notes 11 & 13.
159. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *101.
160. No. 03A01-9509-CV-00307, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 27, 1996).
161. Id. at *10.
162. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *103.
163. 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
164. Id. at 681.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2003) (emphasis added).
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of persons—indirect purchasers—from recovery for non-business
166
The court, however, emphasized the General
injuries . . . .”
Assembly’s choice to include the phrase “any person” and that by
doing so, “the General Assembly intended to provide a recovery for
167
all consumers.”
While the defendants argued the court should interpret the
Act consistent with Illinois Brick, the court noted that under North
Carolina case law, “[f]ederal case law interpretations of the federal
antitrust laws [were merely] persuasive authority in construing [its]
168
own antitrust statutes.”
Even the Bunker’s court recognized and
169
found “instructive” that North Carolina and Tennessee lacked
170
“federal guidance clause[s]”
and had, accordingly, “rejected
judicial attempts to constrict the range of persons injured by illegal
activity who [could] maintain a state-law-based antitrust cause of
171
action in state court.”
Like in Comes and Bunker’s, the court also explained that the
most recent substantive change to the North Carolina Antitrust Act
occurred in 1969, but that Illinois Brick was not decided until 1977.
“It follows,” explained the court, “that [the] General Assembly
could not have intended to adopt a judicial construction of [the
172
Antitrust Act] which did not exist at the time of the revision.”
After all, “[i]t is a familiar canon of statutory construction that
when a legislature borrows from the statutes of another legislative
body, the provisions of that legislation should be construed as they
173
were in the other jurisdiction at the time of their adoption.”
Accordingly, the court “consider[ed] as persuasive authority
federal cases interpreting the federal antitrust laws as they existed
174
in 1969.”
Defendants next argued that the “General Assembly’s failure
to explicitly amend [the Act] to allow an indirect purchaser
standing . . . demonstrate[d] that the General Assembly accepted

166. Hyde, supra note 37, at 684.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 103.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hyde, supra note 37, at 684.
173. Id. (citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994); Carolene Prods.
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1944)).
174. Id. (listing the federal cases pre-Illinois Brick where indirect purchasers
were granted standing to sue under the Clayton Act for Sherman Act violations).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 6
KARON-READY.DOC

1376

5/20/2004 8:56 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

175

the Illinois Brick rule.”
But the court disagreed, citing Blake v.
Abbott Laboratories and explaining, “the intent of the General
Assembly may only be discerned by its actions, and not its failure to
176
act.” As a result, the lack of “indirect purchaser” language in the
177
Act was “of no consequence.”
Finally, the court agreed that the Illinois Brick Court’s concerns
178
about multiple liability and complexity were groundless.
According to ARC America, Illinois Brick was “concerned solely with
the construction of federal antitrust laws, and not at all with state
179
courts’ constructions of state antitrust laws;” ARC America held
that “no federal policy [existed] against states imposing liability in
180
addition to that imposed by federal law” and that both direct and
indirect purchasers had sufficient incentive to sue for antitrust
181
Since North Carolina’s state courts were “free to
violations.
interpret [their] antitrust laws in a manner believe[d] to be most
182
consistent with the purposes behind [them],” the court held
indirect purchasers had standing under the North Carolina
183
Antitrust Act to sue for price fixing violations.
V. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT PERMIT INDIRECT PURCHASERS
TO PURSUE PRICE FIXING CLAIMS UNDER THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS,
BUT WHERE CONSUMERS HAVE NEVER REALIZED
OR PURSUED THEIR CLAIMS
Like Iowa, Arizona, Tennessee and North Carolina, other
states’ antitrust statutes also permit indirect purchasers to pursue
price fixing claims, but those states’ consumers do not realize
claims exist and, accordingly, have never pursued them.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Hyde, supra note 37 at 687.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688.
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A. Louisiana
1. Why the Louisiana Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations
The Louisiana Antitrust Act reads,
Any person who is injured in his business or property by
any person by reason of any act or thing forbidden by this
Part may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and
shall recover threefold the damages sustained by him [or
184
her], the cost of suit, and a reasonable attorney’s fee.
Louisiana courts are instructed to “give effect to all parts of a
statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes
any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be
185
avoided.”
And “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in
186
search of the intent of the legislature.”
The Louisiana Act’s plain wording does not exclude any class
of “person injured,” nor require, much less suggest, a person must
have been directly injured. Instead, its plain language is allinclusive. When considering this identical issue, the Comes,
Bunker’s, Sherwood and Hyde courts, whose states’ antitrust statutes
contain similar “person” language, all concluded “person” was
unambiguous, all-inclusive, and meant indirect purchasers, and
187
they all applied their states’ antitrust acts to them. The Louisiana
188
Act’s subject is “any person,” and according to the Louisiana Civil
Code, “[t]here are two kinds of persons: natural persons and
189
juridical persons. A natural person is a human being.”
Given the
Civil Code’s unambiguous definition, the Louisiana Act likewise
applies to consumers.
But despite the clarity of the term “persons,” if a Louisiana
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:137 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
185. See, e.g., City of Pineville v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees,
791 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. 2001).
186. Cleco Evangeline, LLC v. La. Tax Comm’n, 808 So. 2d 740, 744 (La. Ct.
App. 2001).
187. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 107; Comes, supra note 37, at 445; Hyde, supra
note 37; Sherwood, supra note 59, at *92; see also Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d
9, 13 (Vt. 2002) (holding “any person” means indirect purchasers for purposes of
Vermont’s consumer fraud act).
188. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:129 (2003).
189. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
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court believed “person” was ambiguous, it would need to interpret
this term. “[T]he interpretation of a term within a statute is not
merely a question of semantics, but requires an inquiry into the
reason, purpose, context and legislative history of the statute as well
190
as other laws relative to the same subject matter”:
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by
considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the
same subject matter, placing a construction on the
provision in question that is consistent with the express
terms of the law and with the obvious intent of
191
the legislature enacting it.
“[B]ecause the rules of statutory construction require that the
general intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the law
192
must, if possible, be given effect,” a Louisiana statute must “be
applied ad [sic] interpreted in a manner which is consistent with
logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the
193
legislature in passing it.”
As the Comes, Bunker’s, and Hyde courts noted of their states’
antitrust statutes, the Louisiana Antitrust Act’s history reveals it was
enacted at the same time as the Sherman Act—long before Illinois
Brick was ever decided and during which time indirect purchasers
had antitrust standing:
A review of the legislative history of the Louisiana Antitrust Legislation reveals that the first legislation
prohibiting trusts and conspiracies in restraint of trade
and a prohibition of monopolies was passed by La. Acts
No. 86 in 1890, the same year the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act was enacted. Since that time the legislation
has changed very little. See Louisiana Power & Light v.
United Gas Pipe Line, 493 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1986).
It is apparent that the concerns which spurred the
enactment of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act are the
same as those which influenced Louisiana’s adoption of
194
virtually identical antitrust legislation.
190. Reppond v. City of Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224, 228 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
191. City of Pineville v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 791
So. 2d 609, 612 (La. 2001).
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Board of Comm’rs v. S. D. Hunter Found., 354 So. 2d 156, 168
(La. 1977) (holding that the district court’s statutory interpretation properly
considered the legislature’s intention at the time it passed the statute).
194. Reppond, 572 So. 2d at 228.
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Given Illinois Brick’s nonexistence at the time the Louisiana Act
was enacted and that indirect purchasers could freely pursue
federal antitrust claims at that time, the Louisiana Legislature’s
intent could not have been to preclude indirect purchasers from
pursuing price fixing claims. Authority suggesting such preclusion
would not exist for almost another hundred years. Because the
Louisiana Legislature’s 1890 antitrust legislation did not specifically
limit standing to direct purchasers (nor has it since, for that
matter), the term “person” cannot be taken to preclude indirect
purchasers, but must instead be read to include them. Thus, if the
term “any person” was even subject to judicial interpretation, the
Act could only be taken to confer natural persons antitrust
standing, as they had standing at the time the Louisiana Act was
enacted.
While a potential price fixing defendant may consider it
noteworthy that Louisiana’s Legislature has chosen not to repeal
the Illinois Brick decision, no need for such action existed
considering the legislature’s intent.
The legislature’s
understandable inaction contrasts markedly with the Tennessee
Legislature’s, which “on three occasions [unsuccessfully] . . . sought
to pass legislation to expressly confer standing on indirect
195
purchasers.” Yet despite these three failed efforts, the Blake court
believed “proposed legislation, not enacted, ha[d] no consequence
196
whatever on the interpretation of an existing statute,” and it
granted standing to indirect purchasers. Because no similar efforts
have ever been proposed to, much less rejected by, Louisiana’s
Legislature, even more reason exists to interpret the Louisiana
Antitrust Act as granting standing to indirect purchasers.
Louisiana’s Antitrust Act also contains no harmonization
clause. Because its Act “is a counterpart to § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Sherman Act should be a persuasive influence on the
interpretation of our own state enactment. However, the federal
197
analysis is not controlling,” and Louisiana courts are nowhere
195. Blake, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184, at *9.
196. Id.; see also Hyde, supra note 37, at 687 (“The rule in North Carolina is
clear that the intent of the General Assembly may only be discerned by its actions,
and not its failure to act.”).
197. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d
1149, 1158 (La. 1986) (emphasis added); accord State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens,
Inc., 684 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Sherman Act is a persuasive influence on the interpretation
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required to mechanically invoke Illinois Brick to extinguish their
consumers’ indirect purchaser price fixing claims.
Finally, not to be forgotten is that Illinois Brick merely
instructed that indirect purchasers could not pursue price fixing
198
claims under the federal antitrust laws.
Illinois Brick said nothing
as to whether indirect purchasers could sue under state antitrust
laws. Instead, ARC America addressed this issue and held indirect
purchasers could pursue state antitrust claims and that doing so did
not conflict with prevailing federal law. In this respect, construing
the Louisiana Antitrust Act as permitting indirect purchasers to
pursue price fixing claims is actually consistent with, not contrary
to, federal law.
2. Why Free v. Abbott Laboratories and FTC v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc. Do Not Preclude Louisiana Indirect
Purchaser Standing
199

In Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Judge John Parker concluded
that “Louisiana would be on sound ground in following the lead of
the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick and [held] that
these indirect purchasers have suffered no antitrust damage under
200
Louisiana’s antitrust law . . . .”
But in addition to Free being
wrongly decided for the reasons already explained, federal
decisions, particularly those concerning standing, are considered
merely persuasive and not binding on Louisiana state courts:
Federal cases are generally more restrictive in finding
standing than are state court opinions because of the
provisions of Article III of the United States Constitution,
which limits the federal judicial power to “cases and
controversies.” No comparable limitation is found in the
Louisiana Constitution. Article VII, Section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution provides, in part: “No function
shall ever be attached to any court of record, or to the
judges thereof, except such as are judicial . . . .” This has
of our state statutes.”); Reppond v. Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224, 228 n.2 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (“Although the federal jurisprudence interpreting the Sherman
Antitrust Act is not controlling, it may be used as persuasive interpretation of our
own state anti-trust statute.”).
198. See Hyde, supra note 37, at 687 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court in
ARC America stated that Illinois Brick was concerned solely with the construction of
federal antitrust laws, and not at all with state court constructions of state antitrust
laws.”).
199. 982 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. La. 1997).
200. Id. at 1218.
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been interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the State
courts to “justiciable controversies.” Stoddard v. City of New
Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So. 2d 9 (1964). Thus, the
federal decisions should be considered persuasive to the
extent that they recognize “justiciability”, but are not
necessarily limitations on the jurisdiction of the state
201
courts.
202
In FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. (Mylan I), the FTC and
thirty-two state attorneys general as parens patriae sued certain drug
companies for, among other things, alleged Sherman and Clayton
Act violations relating to producing and marketing certain brand203
name drugs.
The defendant drug companies moved to dismiss,
arguing that plaintiffs had not stated claims upon which relief
could be granted, and that the court lacked subject matter
204
jurisdiction over certain aspects of the plaintiffs’ complaints.
Judge Thomas Hogan granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss
twenty-one states’ restitution or disgorgement claims for indirect
purchasers because he believed these claims were unauthorized
205
under section 16 of the Clayton Act. In particular, he ruled the
Louisiana Attorney General could not assert indirect purchaser
claims under the Louisiana Antitrust Act “because federal law does
206
not give indirect purchasers standing.”
207
But in Mylan II, sixteen state attorneys general, including
Louisiana’s, requested that Judge Hogan reconsider his ruling
208
In doing so, Judge Hogan
dismissing their restitution claims.
209
recognized an “internal inconsistency” in his ruling granting
defendants’ motions to dismiss and acknowledged that myriad
states actually “permit the state to pursue equitable remedies” on
210
behalf of indirect purchasers. Reinstating “Louisiana’s claims for
211
equitable monetary relief under [the Louisiana Antitrust Act],”
201. Louisiana Indep. Auto Dealers Assoc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 796, 799 n.1 (La.
1974). See also Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Louisiana, 669 So. 2d 1185,
1192 (La. 1996) (holding that federal decisions on standing and justiciability
“should be considered persuasive”).
202. 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Mylan I].
203. Id. at 32-33.
204. Id. at 33.
205. Id. at 44-53.
206. Id. at 47.
207. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Mylan II].
208. Id. at 3.
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 6; see also supra text accompanying note 60, ¶2.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 6
KARON-READY.DOC

1382

5/20/2004 8:56 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

Judge Hogan instructed that the Louisiana Attorney General is
212
authorized to sue under the Antitrust Act, and the Act “does not
limit the state’s ability to pursue the full range of equitable
213
relief.”
Accordingly, “[t]he Court . . . grant[ed]
Louisiana’s motion and permit[ted] the state to pursue claims for
214
restitution on behalf of both direct and indirect purchasers.”
B. South Carolina
1. Why the South Carolina Antitrust Act Permits Indirect
Purchasers to Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing
Violations
The South Carolina Antitrust Act reads:
Any person who may be injured or damaged by any such
arrangement, contract, agreement, trust or combination
described in [the Antitrust Act] may sue for and recover,
in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State, from
any person operating such trust or combination, the full
consideration or sum paid by him [or her] for any goods,
wares, merchandise or articles the sale of which is
215
controlled by such combination or trust.
South Carolina’s Antitrust Act further instructs that
“ ‘[p]erson’ shall include natural persons, corporations, trusts,
partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any
216
other legal entity.”
South Carolina courts have indicated that
“[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
217
effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.” “If a statute’s
language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and
definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of
statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or
212. Mylan II, supra note 207, at 6.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 7.
215. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-30 (Law Co-op. 2003) (emphasis added).
216. Id. § 39-5-10 (defining “person” in the context of South Carolina’s Unfair
Trade Practices Act, which, like its Antitrust Act, is found both in Title 39 (the
Code’s “Trade and Commerce” section) and is intended to protect consumers and
commerce) (emphasis added); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm’n, 261 S.E.2d 309, 310 (S.C. 1979) (defining “person” as “natural person”
in a tax dispute).
217. Joint Legis. Comm. for Judicial Screening ex rel. McConnell v. Huff, 464
S.E.2d 324, 326 (S.C. 1995).
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218

impose another meaning.”
“The legislature is presumed to have
fully understood the meaning of the words used in a statute and,
unless this meaning is vague or indefinite, intended to use them in
their ordinary and common meaning or in their well-defined legal
219
sense.”
Given this directive, “person” can only be said to mean
indirect purchasers or consumers.
But should a South Carolina court somehow believe the term
“person” to be ambiguous, the court would be required to construe
the Antitrust Act, and its primary function when doing so would be
220
“to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”
“A
statutory provision should be given a reasonable construction
221
consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute,”
and “[a]ny ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a
222
just, equitable, and beneficial operation of the law.”
Like the Sherman Act, the South Carolina Antitrust Act was
enacted in 1897—long before Illinois Brick was decided. As a result,
the South Carolina Legislature could only have intended to permit
antitrust standing to all persons—including consumers—when it
passed the Act, as both direct and indirect purchasers had antitrust
standing at that time.
Moreover, the South Carolina Antitrust Act contains no
harmonization clause. As a result, federal court decisions “may be
223
persuasive,” not mandatory, authority, and South Carolina courts
are not required to follow them when interpreting their Antitrust
224
Act.
Indeed, where no South Carolina court has addressed an
issue, South Carolina courts “may look to other states to determine
if the issue has been decided and if the decision is persuasive

218. City of Columbia v. ACLU of S.C., Inc., 475 S.E.2d 747, 749 (S.C. 1996);
see also Brown v. State, 540 S.E.2d 846, 850 (S.C. 2001) (“When the terms of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court must apply them according to their
literal meaning.”).
219. Pee v. AVM, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 232, 235 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Lester v. S.C. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 514 S.E.2d 751, 753 (S.C. 1999).
221. Davis v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 484 S.E.2d 471, 472 (S.C. 1997).
222. City of Sumter Police Dep’t v. One (1) 1992 Blue Mazda Truck, 498
S.E.2d 894, 896 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bennett v. Sullivan’s Island Bd. of
Adjustment, 438 S.E.2d 273, 274 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
223. See State v. Colf, 525 S.E.2d 246, 248 (S.C. 2000) (Where state rules are
the same as federal rules, “federal cases may be persuasive.”).
224. See State v. Thrift, No. 23957, 1994 S.C. LEXIS 25, at *23 (S.C. Jan. 17,
1994) (noting “the federal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, while
persuasive, [is] not binding”); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 524 (S.C. 1992)
(explaining that federal decisions are “persuasive” authority).
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225

authority.”
In this manner, South Carolina courts are free to
consider the well-reasoned Comes, Bunker’s, Sherwood and Hyde
decisions when holding their Antitrust Act applicable to
consumers.
2. Why In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation and FTC v.
Mylan Laboratories, Inc. Do Not Preclude South Carolina
Indirect Purchaser Standing
226

In In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein
believed, “[e]ven were [South Carolina’s] antitrust laws to be
construed to apply to wholly interstate shipments, South Carolina
courts would deny recovery to plaintiff because it would construe its
statute to permit recovery only by direct purchasers in the same way
227
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act.”
Not
only was In re Wiring Device wrongly decided for the reasons
described, as likewise explained, federal decisions are persuasive,
228
not binding, on South Carolina state courts. And while in Mylan
I, Judge Hogan also wrongly dismissed South Carolina’s Unfair
Trade Practices Act claim, believing “indirect purchasers [could]
not seek damages or restitution . . . [because n]o provision in the
statute expressly authorize[d] such relief and . . . absent explicit
authorization by state statute or case law, such relief [could] not be
229
granted,” in Mylan II he “reinstate[d] South Carolina’s claim for
restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the South
230
Carolina UTPA.”
C. Montana
1. Why the Montana Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations
According to the Montana Antitrust Act, “[a]ny person, if
injured thereby, . . . may maintain an action to enjoin a
continuance of an act in violation of [the Montana Antitrust Act]

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Silva v. Silva, 509 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1998).
498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 85-86 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
See supra notes 223, 224.
Mylan I, supra note 202, at 51.
Mylan II, supra note 207, at 9; see also supra note 60, ¶ 2.
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231

and for the recovery of damages.”
Montana’s Antitrust Act is
found in its Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), and according to
the UTPA’s “Definitions” section, “ ‘[p]erson’ includes any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, joint-stock company, or other
232
association engaged in business within this state.”
When considering to whom its antitrust act applies, Montana
courts are required to interpret the Act’s words according to the
legislature’s intent and the words’ ordinary meaning:
When interpreting statutes, this Court’s only function is to
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. When we
interpret a statute we determine legislative intent based
on the plain and ordinary language used by the
Legislature whenever possible.
This Court must
reasonably and logically interpret statutory language in a
233
manner giving words their usual and ordinary meaning.
Despite this instruction, should a Montana court consider
“person” ambiguous, the court is simply to interpret a statute
according to the “plain meaning of the words and phraseology
234
The standard
employed,” giving words their usual construction.
235
dictionary definition instructs that “person” means “individuals,”
and “person” can only be taken to mean indirect purchasers or
consumers.
Montana’s Antitrust Act also dates back to 1937—long before
Illinois Brick was decided. Because Montana courts’ “function when
interpreting statutes ‘is to give effect to the intent of the
236
legislature,’ ” its Antitrust Act could only have been intended to
confer antitrust standing on all persons, which necessarily includes
indirect purchasers.
Finally, Montana’s Antitrust Act contains no harmonization
clause.
Accordingly, not only are federal decisions merely
237
persuasive authority when interpreting the Act, but Montana
courts may also consider “persuasive authorities from [Montana’s]
231. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-222 (2003) (emphasis added).
232. Id. § 30-14-202(7) (2003).
233. Crone v. Crone, 77 P.3d 167, 169 (Mont. 2003) (citations omitted).
234. State v. Hayes, 32 P. 415, 416 (Mont. 1893).
235. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 877 (1991) (defining
“person” as “human, individual”).
236. State v. Lacasella, 60 P.3d 975, 983 (2002) (Rice, J., dissenting).
237. See Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 67 P.3d 306, 310 (Mont. 2003)
(“[W]e find several decisions in the federal circuits to be persuasive . . . .”);
Roosevelt v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 975 P.2d 295, 302 (Mont. 1999)
(considering federal authority “to the extent that . . . [it was] persuasive . . . .”).
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238

sister states,”
such as Iowa, Arizona, Tennessee and North
Carolina, where indirect purchaser standing has been approved.
2. Why Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc. Does Not
Preclude Montana Indirect Purchaser Standing
239

the Montana
In Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc.,
Supreme Court confessed “there is minimal Montana law
interpreting the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and no cases
240
interpreting [Montana’s Antitrust Act].”
The court also
explained the differences between Montana and the Sherman Act’s
“restraint of trade” sections:
Although this section is modeled after § 1 of the Sherman
Act, it differs in one critical respect. The Sherman Act
requires two or more persons to be involved in the
unlawful trade restraint; in effect, a conspiracy must exist.
However, the Montana counterpart states that a “person”
may violate this section. Thus, the Montana statute on
restraint of trade facially appears to be broader than the
Sherman Act, as one person acting alone may violate the
241
Montana statute.
With regard to the Montana “monopolization” section,
however, the court explained it was “very similar to § 2 of the
Sherman Act . . . [and that the court] will give due weight to the
federal courts’ interpretation of this type of alleged antitrust
242
violation.”
While a potential price fixing defendant may engage the
foregoing language to suggest Montana courts must slavishly follow
Illinois Brick to deny indirect purchasers standing, indirect
purchaser cases do not involve monopolization claims, and indirect
purchaser (“unlawful trade restraint”) claims are to be construed
more “broadly” than if brought under the Sherman Act. And in
any event, federal cases do not necessarily control Montana courts
243
since they are considered merely “persuasive” authority.

238. Melton v. Oleson, 530 P.2d 466, 470 (Mont. 1974).
239. 858 P.2d 11 (1993).
240. Id. at 13.
241. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Roosevelt v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 975 P.2d 295, 302 (Mont. 1999)
(explaining federal authority is merely “persuasive” authority).
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VI. NON-REPEALER STATES WITH ANTITRUST ACTS THAT CONTAIN
HARMONIZATION CLAUSES, YET INDIRECT PURCHASERS MAY
STILL PROPERLY PURSUE PRICE FIXING CLAIMS
Of the six non-repealer states where indirect purchasers have
standing to pursue antitrust claims, three states’ antitrust acts
contain harmonization clauses. When considering harmonization
clauses, some courts (as will be discussed later) have improperly
interpreted them to deny indirect purchaser standing pursuant to
244
245
Illinois Brick, while others have not.
A. Utah
1. Why the Utah Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations
Section 76-10-919 of Utah’s Antitrust Act, entitled “Person may
bring action for injunctive relief and damages,” explains that “[a]
person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business or
property by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an
246
action for injunctive relief and damages.”
Utah’s Criminal Code, where its Antitrust Act is found, defines
247
In Utah, “[t]he primary rule of
“person” as “an individual.”
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purposes the statute was meant to
248
achieve,” and the “best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the
249
plain meaning of the statute.”
Where, like here, “the relevant
250
statutory language is unambiguous,” it “‘may not be interpreted
251
to contradict its plain meaning,’” and “person” must necessarily
include consumers or indirect purchasers.
However, if a Utah court was compelled to interpret the Act
because it considered the term “person” ambiguous, the court’s
primary goal must be “to evince the ‘true intent and purpose of the
244. See infra n.282.
245. See Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102.
246. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-919 (2003) (emphasis added).
247. Id. § 76-1-601.
248. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1996)
(quoting Sullivan v. Sconlar Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)).
249. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 922
P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996).
250. State v. Hodges, 63 P.3d 66, 70 (Utah 2002).
251. Id. (quoting Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)).
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252

Legislature.’”
Because the Legislature enacted Utah’s Antitrust
Act in 1953—more than twenty years before Illinois Brick was
decided—the Legislature could only have intended that its Act
grant standing to all persons, including indirect purchasers,
because no contrary legislative or judicial scheme existed at that
time.
Because “no Utah case has evaluated the elements of a civil
253
antitrust violation under the Utah Antitrust Act,” Utah courts
invoking the Act’s harmonization statute are to be “guided by
interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal
antitrust statutes and by other state courts to comparable state
254
antitrust statutes.”
The Act’s harmonization clause does not
require that Utah courts interpret their Antitrust Act to deny
indirect purchasers standing pursuant to Illinois Brick. Instead, it
explains that state court decisions (such as Comes, Bunker’s, Sherwood
and Hyde) concerning comparable state antitrust statutes can also be
255
considered when construing the Act. To the extent the Sherman
Act interpretations are considered, Utah’s harmonization clause
can be described not as defining who can sue under its Antitrust
Act, but instead as advancing Utah and federal laws’ uniform
application prohibiting anticompetitive conduct, as explained by the
256
Comes and Bunker’s courts.
And not to be overlooked, federal
law—ARC America—instructed that indirect purchasers can pursue
price fixing claims under state antitrust statutes.
2. Why FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. Does Not Preclude
Utah Indirect Purchaser Standing
In Mylan I, Judge Hogan dismissed Utah’s indirect purchaser
claims, explaining “[n]o statutory or common law authority
specifically addresses the issue of damages for such purchasers or
for equitable monetary relief . . . . [and] absent express

252. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 63 P.3d 705, 710 (2002) (quoting State v.
Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680 (2002)).
253. Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 29 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah
2001).
254. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-926 (1953); see also id. at 661 (explaining Utah
courts invoke harmonization clause when interpreting Utah’s Antitrust Act).
255. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-926.
256. Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106. For a more
comprehensive discussion concerning indirect purchaser standing despite
harmonization clauses, see infra Part VII.
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257

authorization, such relief will not be granted.”
But in Mylan II,
although Judge Hogan still denied Utah’s damages claim on behalf
of indirect purchasers, he reinstated “Utah’s claims for restitution
258
under the Utah Antitrust Statute . . . .”
While this ruling may
appear internally inconsistent, it nevertheless endorses Utah
indirect purchaser claims’ vitality, albeit for restitution only.
B. Virginia
The Virginia Antitrust Act, entitled “Personal suit for injunction
or actual damages,” provides:
(a) Any person threatened with injury or damage to his [or
her] business or property by reason of a violation of this
chapter may institute an action or proceeding for
injunctive relief when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief is granted in other cases.
(b) Any person injured in his [or her] business or property
by reason of a violation of this chapter may recover the
actual damages sustained, and, as determined by the
court, the costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees. If
the trier of facts finds that the violation is willful or
flagrant, it may increase damages to an amount not in
259
excess of three times the actual damages sustained.
When interpreting a statute, Virginia courts are to consider the
statute’s plain words:
[I]n interpreting those subsections, we look no further
than the words utilized by the General Assembly. “We
must . . . assume that the legislature chose, with care, the
words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we
are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.”
“The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly
260
disclosed by its language, must be applied.”
According to Virginia’s Antitrust Act, “[t]he term ‘person’
includes, unless the context otherwise requires, any natural
261
person . . . .”
Furthermore, “unless otherwise defined by statute
[which has not occurred], the term ‘natural person’ means just

257. Mylan I, supra note 202, at 52.
258. Mylan II, supra note 207, at 9; see also supra note 60, ¶ 2.
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.12 (Michie 1974).
260. Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Antietam Square
Condo., 540 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Va. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
261. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.3 (Michie 1974).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

39

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 6
KARON-READY.DOC

1390

5/20/2004 8:56 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

262

that—a natural person.” And “[w]hen the legislature has spoken
plainly it is not the function of courts to change or amend its
enactments under the guise of construing them [since t]he
province of construction lies wholly within the domain of
263
ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no interpretation.”
Because the Act’s plain wording does not exclude any class of
persons, but rather describes persons as just that—natural
persons—the Act, by its terms, can be invoked by indirect
purchasers. But to the extent a Virginia court may believe “person”
“is ambiguous, [it] must construe the Statute to ascertain and give
264
effect to the intention of the legislature.”
The Virginia Antitrust
Act was enacted in 1974—three years before Illinois Brick. Because
“[t]he object of judicial interpretation of a statute is to ascertain
265
the intention of the legislature,” the Act could have, again, only
been intended to apply to indirect purchasers.
But while Virginia courts “have authority . . . to act with respect
to violations of the Virginia Antitrust Act[, u]nder [its
harmonization statute], the Virginia Antitrust Act must be applied
266
and construed harmoniously with the Sherman Act.”
In
particular, Virginia’s Antitrust Act “shall be applied and construed
to effectuate its general purposes in harmony with judicial
267
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions.”
Again, this harmonization clause does not require Virginia courts to
blindly follow Illinois Brick and deny indirect purchasers standing
because this clause can be described not as defining who can sue
under its Antitrust Act, but instead as intended to achieve uniform
application prohibiting anticompetitive conduct under Virginia
268
and federal laws.
Additionally, of course, under ARC America,
federal law permits indirect purchaser lawsuits to be brought under

262. Armstrong v. NEWVA Enter., 23 Va. Cir. 352, 354 (1991) (also noting
“Black’s Law Dictionary . . . states: Person. In general usage, a human being (i.e.,
natural person), though by statute term may include a firm, labor organizations,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in
bankruptcy, or receivers.”).
263. Winston v. Richmond, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (Va. 1954).
264. Armstrong v. Erasmo, 263 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Va. 1980).
265. Sellers v. Bles, 92 S.E.2d 486, 494 (Va. 1952) (citing Miller v. State
Entomologist, 135 S.E. 813, 817 (Va. 1926)).
266. Kuhn v. West Alexandria Prop., Inc., 22 Va. Cir. 439, 457 (1980).
267. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (Michie 1974).
268. Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106; see also infra
Part VII.
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269

state law.

C. Delaware

270

According to the Delaware Antitrust Act, only “[t]he Attorney
General may bring suit as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons
residing in this State to secure monetary relief for such persons
who are injured in their businesses or property by a violation of this
271
chapter.”
Although the Act does not define “natural persons,”
“[p]rinciples of statutory construction require that undefined
272
words in a statute be given their common, ordinary meaning.” In
addition to the standard dictionary definition of “person,”
Delaware case law discussing other statutes routinely interprets
273
“natural persons” to mean individuals.
Should a Delaware court consider “natural person”
ambiguous, however, it is instructed to “resolve the ambiguity by
274
reconciling the statutory language with the legislative intent.”
“The language of [the Delaware Antitrust Act] is virtually identical
275
to the opening provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act,” and the
276
suggests “it was the Delaware
Act’s harmonization clause
269. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
270. Because the Delaware Antitrust Act was enacted in 1979, this section
contains no discussion concerning it predating Illinois Brick. See 62 Del. Laws, ch.
89, §1 (1979).
271. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108 (2003); see also Maddock v. Greenville Ret.
Cmty., L.P., No. 12564, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, *22 (“[T]he Delaware [antitrust]
statute does not permit individuals to enforce their rights by bringing private
actions . . . . Instead of providing for a private right of action, the Delaware statute
expressly grants the state attorney general the right to bring remedial actions.”).
272. Jackson v. Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, 700 A.2d 1203, 1205
(Del. 1997).
273. S&R Assocs., L.P., III v. Shell Oil Co., 725 A.2d 431, 437-48 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1998) (in context of U.C.C. claim, explaining that legislature intended
“natural persons” to mean “individuals,” not corporations or limited partnerships);
see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Elkay Mfg. Co., Nos. 98C-11-262 WCC and
99C-11-144 WCC, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 13, *27-28 (Jan. 17, 2003) (“[T]he
legislature has specifically defined ‘natural person’ to exclude corporations.”);
Industrial Accident Bd. Second Injury & Contingency Fund v. Photo Color, Inc.,
Nos. 97A-01-018-WCC and 97A-06-014-WCC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 660, *8 (Nov.
30, 1999) (“While ‘person’ is not specifically defined in the statute, it has been
commonly defined as, ‘a human being (i.e., natural person) . . . .’ ”).
274. Jackson, 700 A.2d at 1205.
275. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese, No. 7128, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 400, *12
(June 14, 1983).
276. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2113 (2003) (“This chapter shall be construed in
harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust
statutes.”).
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Legislature’s intention to adopt not only the language but the
277
In
judicial interpretation and application of the Sherman Act.”
keeping with Comes’ harmonization clause analysis and ARC
America’s teachings, as well as the Delaware Antitrust Act’s purpose
“to promote the public benefits of a competitive economic
278
environment based upon free enterprise,” the Delaware Antitrust
Act’s harmonization clause does not require that Delaware courts
279
automatically deny standing to indirect purchasers.
VII. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT DO NOT, YET SHOULD, PERMIT
INDIRECT PURCHASERS TO PURSUE PRICE FIXING CASES UNDER
THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS
Despite having antitrust statutes containing identical “any
280
281
person” language and defining “person” broadly, courts in five
277. Hammermill, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *12.
278. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (2003) (emphasis added); see also WEBSTER’S,
supra note 235, at 952 (defining “public” as “a group of people having common
interests or characteristics”) (emphasis added).
279. See also infra Part VII.
280. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-35 (2003) (“The state, or any person, including, but
not limited to, a consumer, injured in its business or property by any violation of the
provisions of this chapter shall recover treble damages . . . .”) (emphasis added);
MO. REV. STAT. § 416.121 (2003) (“Any person . . . who is injured in his [or her]
business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by [the
Antitrust Act] may sue therefor in any circuit court of this state . . . and [s]uch
person may: (1) Sue for damages sustained by him . . . .”) (emphasis added); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:11 (2003) (“Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of this chapter may recover the actual damages
sustained . . . .”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 205 (2003) (“Any person
who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of this act, may
obtain appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief and monetary damages and
shall recover threefold the damages sustained . . . .”) (emphasis added); TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21 (2003) (“Any person . . . whose business or property has
been injured by reason of any conduct declared unlawful in [the Antitrust Act]
may sue any person, other than a municipal corporation, in district court in any
county of this state . . . .”) (emphasis added).
281. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-25 (2003) (“ ‘Person’ means any individual,
proprietorship, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership,
incorporated and unincorporated association, or any other legal or commercial
entity . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 416.021 (2003) (“ ‘Person’ means any individual,
corporation, firm, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association or any
other legal or commercial entity . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:1 (2003)
(“ ‘Person’ shall include, where applicable, natural persons, trusts, government
entities, corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, proprietorships,
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.”); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:13 (2003) (“For the purposes of this chapter, ‘person’ shall
mean an individual, corporation, trust, estate, partnership, association, or any
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of the eight non-repealer states where indirect purchaser standing
to pursue price fixing antitrust claims has been denied ruled
against indirect purchaser standing largely because their states’
282
antitrust statutes contain harmonization clauses.
Courts in the
three remaining states have imposed “de facto” harmonization
283
requirements
even though their antitrust statutes employ
similarly broad “person” language and do not contain
284
harmonization clauses.
other legal entity.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 202 (2003) (“‘Person’ means a natural
person . . . .”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (2003) (“The term ‘person’
means a natural person . . . .”).
282. Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048, 1058-59 (Conn. 2002) (invoking
its Antitrust Act’s harmonization clause, the Connecticut Supreme Court
overbroadly explained its “legislature intended to ‘[give] Connecticut an
[antitrust] law similar to the existing federal [antitrust] law in every respect’ ”);
Duvall v. Silvers, 998 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Missouri’s antitrust
statutes [must] be construed ‘in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of
comparable federal antitrust statutes.’ ”) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 416.141 (2003));
Minuteman v. Microsoft Corp., 795 A.2d 833, 837 (N.H. 2002) (“By including RSA
356:14 [the harmonization clause] in the statute, the legislature expressly
encouraged a uniform construction with federal antitrust law.”); Major v.
Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002) (“Oklahoma legislature
manifested its clear intent to harmonize the Act with federal antitrust law when it
enacted § 212 [its harmonization clause].”); Abbott Labs. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d
503, 505 (Texas 1995) (“We begin with the Legislature’s mandate that Texas
antitrust law be harmonized with federal antitrust law.” (citing TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 15.04 (2003)).
283. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 718 n.9 (“[T]he holding of Illinois Brick is at
its core a definition of who can be said to have suffered injury under federal
antitrust law, and, therefore, by applying Illinois Brick to R.C. 1331.08, it must be
said that an indirect purchaser is not ‘the person injured.’ ” (emphasis added));
Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“The
Indiana Act was modeled after section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act . . . and
has been interpreted consistent with the federal law interpreting the Federal
Act.”); Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2999-CA-002144-MR, 2001 WL 1835377, *3
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001) (“[W]e, like the trial court, find the reasoning of
Illinois Brick to be highly persuasive . . . and because the [Kentucky] statute is based
upon the Sherman Act, the interpretation of the Sherman Act given by the United
States Supreme Court is highly instructive.”).
Importantly, Arnold is an
unpublished opinion, which “shall never be cited or used as authority in any other
case in any court of this state.” Id. at caption. See also KY. R. CIV. P. 76.28(4)(c)
(“Opinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used as authority in
any other case in any court of this state.”)
284. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.08 (2003) (“the person injured in the person’s
business or property by another person . . . may sue therefor . . . and recover treble
the damages sustained by the person and the person’s costs of suit”) (emphasis
added); id. § 1331.01 (2003) (“ ‘Person’ includes corporations, partnerships, and
associations existing under or authorized by any state or territory of the United
States, and solely for the purpose of the definition of division (B) of this section, a
foreign governmental entity.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-7 (2003) (“Any person who
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Adhering to strict harmonization, however, is a dangerous
proposition. By denying indirect purchasers standing, these eight
courts, perhaps unwittingly, adopted an “ongoing parallel federalstate construction” rule when considering cases under their state
antitrust acts. These rulings mean that when interpreting their
state antitrust acts, these courts must perpetually follow all federal
antitrust jurisprudence’s twists and turns, including federal courts’
285
frequent and oftentimes disparate “u-turns” or “hairpin turns.”
Requiring courts interpreting state antitrust acts to follow everchanging federal antitrust jurisprudence raises vexing practical
problems, undermining the antitrust acts’ stability and integrity.
For example, where the federal circuits are split (such as was
the case before Illinois Brick, when most rejected the direct
purchaser requirement), what federal court must a state court
following the “ongoing parallel federal-state construction” rule
treat as the authoritative source on federal antitrust law and,
accordingly, its antitrust act? Only the view expressed by the
United States Supreme Court, which oftentimes comes only after
years of circuit splits, as occurred in Illinois Brick? Absent a United
States Supreme Court decision, must a state court follow the
majority of the federal circuits? What case law must a state court
follow if no clear majority view even exists? And, as more circuits
weigh in and the previous majority view becomes the minority view,
must state courts reinterpret their antitrust acts? If no federal
circuits but only federal district courts have considered a particular
issue, must state courts defer to them as well? And what if a split
between federal district courts and federal courts of appeals exists?
These questions cannot really be answered but rather serve to

shall be injured in his business or property by any person or corporation by reason
of the doing by any person or persons of anything forbidden or declared to be
unlawful by this chapter may sue therefor in the circuit or superior court of any
county . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 24-1-2-10 (2003) (“The words ‘person’ or
‘persons’ whenever used in this chapter shall be deemed to include corporations,
associations, limited liability companies, joint stock companies, partnerships,
limited or otherwise . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220 (2003) (“Any person who
purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss [by violation of the Antitrust
Act] may bring an action . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 367.110 (2003)
(“ ‘Person’ means natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated
or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.”).
285. And surely Illinois Brick qualifies as a decisional “u-turn” given the
contrary federal case law that preceded it and that followed it, namely ARC
America.
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demonstrate why fastening state antitrust act interpretations to the
federal judiciary’s ongoing Sherman Act interpretations is
unworkable, which is, of course, why none of these state legislatures
has ever required it.
Instead, to the extent harmonization is required,
harmonization aimed not at defining who can sue under a state’s
antitrust act, but instead at achieving the state and federal laws’
uniform application prohibiting noncompetitive practices, such as
286
287
advanced in Comes and Bunker’s is a much more workable
solution. Because state and federal laws regarding similar issues
can and do coexist and oftentimes complement each other by
advancing a common purpose, to the extent harmonization is
required, harmonization of this sort permits state courts to avoid
unworkable ongoing parallel federal-state construction problems.
This is because the conduct proscribed by the Sherman Act, like the
conduct proscribed by these state antitrust acts—namely price
fixing—has always been consistent. Moreover, because ARC America
actually permits indirect purchasers to sue for price fixing violations
under state law, these state courts would be acting in harmony with
federal law, not contrary to it, by permitting indirect purchaser
antitrust standing rather than denying it.
The notion that courts interpreting state antitrust statutes are
powerless to depart from the interpretation a federal court has
given to a federal statute represents a very real and dangerous selfimposed limitation on these courts’ judicial powers. These states’
constitutions place judicial power inalienably in these states’
288
supreme courts, courts of appeals, and lower courts’ hands.
286. See Comes, supra note 37, at 446.
287. See Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106.
288. CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in a supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such lower courts as
the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish.”); IND. CONST.
art. 7, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts as the General
Assembly may establish.”); KY. CONST. § 109 (“The judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be
divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction
known as the District Court.”); MO. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (“The judicial power of the
state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as
prescribed by law, and circuit courts.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 72-a (“The judicial
power of the state shall be vested in the supreme court, a trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the superior court, and such lower courts as the legislature
may establish . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 1 (“The judicial power of the state is
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Under these state constitutions and settled federalism principles,
the power to interpret their state antitrust statutes belongs to state
courts and can neither be taken away by the federal judiciary nor
surrendered by any state court. An ongoing parallel federal-state
construction doctrine abrogates these bedrock principles, and as
Ohio Appellate Judge Mark Philip Painter explained in Johnson v.
Microsoft Corp., “[t]o suggest that Ohio should continue to apply an
ongoing parallel federal-state construction here undermines Ohio
289
courts’ authority and robs consumers of their day in court.”
This type of unquestioning adherence to federal Sherman Act
jurisprudence also contrasts markedly with the deference and
regard these state courts typically pay when considering other
federal statutory interpretations. For instance, these state courts
regularly consider federal procedural decisions when interpreting
their own civil rules, yet many refuse to adopt every federal rule
interpretation in every instance. For example, in Gulf Oil Co. v.
290
Bernard, the United States Supreme Court overturned an order
banning a class action defendant’s unilateral communications with
291
putative class members under Federal Rule 23(d). Of course, the
292
normal federal court practice is to permit these communications.
Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court and Texas Court of Appeals
have held that defendants’ unilateral communications with putative
class members are barred in Ohio and Texas state court class
293
294
actions.
In General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, the United States
vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions
thereof, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may from time to
time be established by law.”); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The judicial power of
this State shall be vested in the Senate . . . a Supreme Court . . . and such
intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute . . . .”); TEX. CONST.
art. V § 1 (“The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in
County Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in
such other courts as may be provided by law.”).
289. Johnson, supra note 73, at 722 (Painter, J., dissenting).
290. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
291. Id. at 104.
292. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §
30.24 (1995).
293. Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 451-52 (Ohio 1998)
(“Unsupervised, unilateral communications with the plaintiff class sabotage the
goal of informed consent by urging exclusion on the basis of a one-sided
presentation of the facts, without opportunity for rebuttal. The damage from
misstatements could well be irreparable.”) (citation omitted); Monsanto Co. v.
Davis, 25 S.W.3d 773, 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (“The anti-suit injunction serves
the same purpose by preventing Defendants from communicating with the absent
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Supreme Court allowed federal judges to “probe behind the
295
pleadings” when deciding class certification, yet the Connecticut
Court of Appeals requires a trial court to look solely to the
296
allegations raised in a plaintiff’s complaint.
And while the
297
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit mere notice pleading,
298
Missouri’s Civil Rules require fact pleading.
As demonstrated,
looking to, considering or being persuaded by federal statutory
interpretations does not mechanically equate to slavishly adopting
all federal statutory interpretations.
These courts’ holdings also belie these states’ long-standing
pronouncements that their courts must apply their legislatures’
intent at the time a statute was adopted until such time as it is
299
amended.
The federal courts’ direct purchaser requirement was
class members via another legal proceeding. Thus, we conclude that the court
could have found the no-communication injunction and the anti-suit injunction
were necessary to prevent the evasion of an important public policy.”).
294. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
295. Id. at 160.
296. Rivera v. Veterans Mem’l Med. Ctr., 818 A.2d 731, 743 (Conn. 2003)
(“[I]n determining whether to certify the class, a [trial] court is bound to take the
substantive allegations of the complaint as true.”) (quoting O’Connor v. N. Amn.,
Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410 (C.D. Cal. 2000)).
297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), requiring a complaint include only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
298. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854
S.W.2d 371, 379 (Mo. 1993) (“Missouri is not a ‘notice pleading’ state.”).
299. See Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 778 A.2d 899, 907 (Conn. 2001)
(“When we construe a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . .”) (quoting Conway v. Wilton,
680 A.2d 242, 248 (1996)); Barber v. Echo Lake Mobile Home Cmty., 759 N.E.2d
253, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Our primary objective when interpreting the
meaning of a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature that enacted
the statute.”); Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 480
(Ky. 1977) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of this or any court is to
construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of the legislature.”); State ex
rel. Sikes v. Williams, 121 S.W. 64, 68 (Mo. 1909) (“It is fundamental that, in the
construction of statutes, the courts should so interpret them as to conform with
the intent of the law making power that enacted them.”); Ahern v. Laconia
Country Club, 392 A.2d 587, 588 (N.H. 1978) (“It is well-established law that the
intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute is the touchstone to its
meaning.”); Henry v. Central Nat’l Bank, 242 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ohio 1968) (“The
primary purpose of the judiciary in the interpretation or construction of statutes is
to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the provisions
enacted, by the application of well settled rules of interpretation; the ultimate
function being to ascertain the legislative will.”) (quoting State ex rel. Shaker
Heights Pub. Library v. Main, 80 N.E.2d 261, 263-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948));
Knight v. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1982) (“The
cardinal rule to be observed in any case involving statutory interpretation is that a
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not adopted until Illinois Brick in 1977, yet all these states’ antitrust
acts (except for Oklahoma’s recently reformed act) were enacted
300
before 1977. Because Illinois Brick’s direct purchaser requirement
was not imposed until 1977, federal case law permitted both
indirect and direct purchasers to recover under the Clayton Act for
Sherman Act violations at the time almost all of these state antitrust
acts were enacted. Because these states’ legislatures likely, if not
certainly, considered the federal courts’ Sherman Act construction
when they created their own antitrust acts, their acts’ constructions
had to resemble that which existed when they were enacted; namely,
301
a construction allowing indirect purchaser claims.
By ignoring their state legislatures’ intentions and instead
adopting harmonization clause constructions that are unworkable,
not practical, and offend their courts’ sovereign rights, these state
courts have chosen to deny recovery to price fixers’ ultimate and
intended victims based on an inference drawn from their
legislatures’ inactions. Courts must let their legislatures’ actions—
not their inactions—prevail. The language in these state antitrust
acts permitting all persons who have been injured by anticompetitive
conduct to pursue their claims must control, even (if not,
especially) absent specific repealer legislation.
Paradoxically, these states’ decisions to impose a direct
court must look to the intent of the legislature and must construe the statute so as
to give effect to that intent.”).
300. Connecticut’s Antitrust Act was enacted in 1971, Indiana’s in 1907,
Kentucky’s in 1972, Missouri’s in 1974, New Hampshire’s in 1917 (yet its section
providing a civil remedy to “persons” was enacted in 1973), Ohio’s in 1898 and
Texas’ in 1961. Oklahoma repealed its original antitrust act and enacted its
Antitrust Reform Act in 1998.
301. Ohio’s Johnson court also relied on its earlier, unreported Acme Wrecking
Co., Inc. v. O’Rourke Const. Co., No. C-930856, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 745 (Mar. 1,
1995), decision to extend the holding of C.K. & J.K., Inc. v. Fairview Shopping Ctr.
Corp., 407 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1980), concerning the Valentine and Sherman Acts’
interrelationship to find a comparable interrelationship between the Valentine
and Clayton Acts. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 714-15. But while the Valentine
Act was adopted in 1898, eight years after Congress enacted the Sherman Act in
1890, the Clayton Act was not enacted until 1914—eighteen years after the
Valentine Act had already become law. While Ohio’s General Assembly clearly had
the prior Sherman Act in mind (which enunciated certain newly proscribed
conduct) when it adopted the Valentine Act, it could not have had the Clayton Act
in mind (which created civil claims for Sherman Act violations). Thus, unlike the
Sherman Act, Ohio’s General Assembly could not have even considered the Clayton
Act when it passed the Valentine Act. So while the court maintained it was
required to read the Valentine Act “in light of” the Sherman Act, the same cannot
be said with respect to the Clayton Act, but neither the Acme Wrecking nor Johnson
courts ever considered this important distinction.
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purchaser requirement concerned public policy and, according to
the Johnson opinion, should have been made by their legislatures
302
rather than their courts.
But in the many years since these state
antitrust acts were first adopted, and on the occasions when their
legislatures deemed it necessary to amend them, their legislatures
have never altered their antitrust acts’ language giving all injured
persons the right to bring claims. Indirect purchasers’ rights
should not be judicially curtailed by superimposing unstated direct
purchaser requirements onto these states’ antitrust acts.
Instead of treating this issue as one their state legislatures
should decide, these courts essentially treat this issue as having
been automatically made the instant Illinois Brick was decided
(while paying no regard to ARC America). These courts believe that
not only did the direct purchaser requirement automatically
become part of their antitrust acts as soon as the Illinois Brick Court
recognized its applicability to Clayton Act claims, but also that their
own state courts are powerless to depart from this federal
interpretation absent specific direction from their state legislatures.
It is entirely inconsistent, however, to rule that their state
legislatures’ assent is not necessary to make the direct purchaser
requirement part of their antitrust acts, yet their legislatures’
affirmative action is necessary to “remove” it, despite these
legislatures having never adopted this requirement in the first
place.
Finally, interpreting these state antitrust acts as permitting only
direct purchaser claims renders them largely meaningless. Under
this interpretation, direct purchasers’ damages claims would arise
not only under the Clayton Act but invariably under these state
antitrust acts as well. After all, to constitute a Sherman Act
violation, the conspiratorial conduct must have been “in restraint
303
of trade or commerce among the several States,” which describes
304
Accordingly, a direct
nearly all modern-day commerce.
purchaser would virtually always pursue a federal claim alleging a
Sherman Act violation rather than a state antitrust claim, which if
originally brought in state court would most certainly be removed
by a defendant to federal court. As a practical matter, then, these
302. Johnson, supra note 73, at 717.
303. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
304. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“[I]t is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business
is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines . . . .”).
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courts’ antitrust act interpretations leave essentially only
“intrastate” conspiracies within their antitrust acts’ scope, such as
when one local newspaper sues another local newspaper for
anticompetitive activities. This restrictive application contrasts
markedly with these states’ directives that entire statutes are
intended to be effective and must not be interpreted to render
305
them largely meaningless.
These eight courts’ decisions neglect their antitrust acts’
language, the policies underlying their antitrust laws’ enforcement,
their citizens’ rights, the practicality of pursuing indirect purchaser
litigation and Illinois Brick and ARC America’s true teachings. No
sensible reasons exist for these states to deny their citizens, all of
them consumers, from pursuing indirect purchaser antitrust claims
when these consumers have been victimized by price fixing in the
same manner as consumers in states where indirect purchaser
306
claims can be brought.
305. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 305
(Conn. 2001) (“It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did
not intend to enact meaningless provisions. Accordingly, care must be taken to
effectuate all provisions of the statute.”) (citations omitted); Guinn v. Light, 558
N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind. 1990) (“In construing a statute, the court must consider the
whole act and, if possible, effect must be given to every word and clause therein.”);
Felts v. Edwards, 204 S.W. 145, 146-47 (Ky. 1918) (“The general rule of
interpretation is, that effect must be given to every word in a statute . . . .”); State ex
rel. Dean v. Daues, 14 S.W.2d 990, 1002 (Mo. 1929) (“[I]t is an elementary and
cardinal rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause, sentence, paragraph, and section of a statute, and a statute should be so
construed that effect may be given to all of its provisions, so that no part, or
section, will be inoperative, superfluous, contradictory, or conflicting, and so that
one section, or part, will not destroy another.”); Town of Wolfeboro (Planning
Bd.) v. Smith, 556 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1989) (“We assume that all words in a
statute were meant to be given meaning in the interpretation of a statute.”); Ford
Motor Co. v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 571 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ohio
1991) (“[E]very word in a statute is designed to have some effect, and hence the
rule that, ‘in putting a construction upon any statute, every part shall be regarded,
and it shall be so expounded, if practicable, as to give some effect to every part of
it.’”) (citations omitted); Muskogee Elec. Traction Co. v. Doering, 172 P. 793, 795
(Okla. 1918) (“As a general rule, statutes are presumed to use words in their
popular sense; but the safest rule of construction is to take the entire provisions of
the statute, and thereby ascertain, if possible, what the Legislature intended.”);
Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001) (“We must presume
that the Legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and that a just and
reasonable result is intended.”).
306. It should also be noted that the Ohio and Oklahoma attorneys general
believe their states’ antitrust acts provide indirect purchaser remedies as evidenced
by their having brought and settled parens patriae claims on behalf of state agency
indirect vitamin purchases. See generally Alaska ex rel. Atty. Gen. Botelho v.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In a way, the Vitamins defendants committed the perfect crime,
one from which they reaped billions of dollars yet were never
required to compensate their ultimate victims—consumers in every
state. The fact that more than half our nation’s consumers sued
and recovered for their indirect purchaser price fixing claims only
exacerbates this injustice, especially considering that nonrecovering consumers either misapprehended their claims’
existence or had their claims wrongly extinguished by earlier,
misguided courts.
Despite traditional thinking, the truth is that thirty-nine (and
307
arguably as many as forty-four ) states grant indirect purchasers
standing, either on their own or through their attorneys general as
parens patriae, to pursue price fixing claims. Among Comes, Bunker’s,
Sherwood and Hyde, all logical arguments to the contrary have been
presented, considered, and rejected. If indirect purchaser claims
in the other non-repealer states seem novel, this is only because
these states’ consumers have never pursued them. Indeed, these
claims were likely considered novel when first advanced in Iowa,
Arizona, Tennessee, and North Carolina. But consumers’ failure to
pursue, or when pursued to succeed on, these claims must not be
taken to mean these claims do not rightly exist. Instead, nonrepealer states’ consumers, like consumers in Iowa, Arizona,
Tennessee and North Carolina, have had antitrust standing and
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., No. A. 01 1583, 2001 WL 1230932 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2001).
Ohio’s attorney general also recently filed and settled another parens patriae case
on behalf of indirect sorbates (a food additive) purchasers. (No reported or
unreported decisions exist from the Ohio attorney general’s Indirect Sorbates
litigation, but a copy of Ohio’s complaint is on file with the author.)
307. Only three of the eight non-repealer states whose courts have ruled
against indirect purchaser standing—Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Texas—
involve state supreme court decisions.
When presented with convincing
arguments, these state supreme courts have been known to overrule their own
earlier opinions. Therefore, the number of indirect purchaser states would
increase to forty-seven if reversals were ultimately made. See City of Waterbury v.
Town of Wash., 800 A.2d 1102, 1126 (Conn. 2002) (Court overruled its own prior
cases, noting “[i]n assessing the force of stare decisis, our case law has emphasized
that we should be especially cautious about overturning a case that concerns
statutory construction. Despite this reluctance, however, we have, on occasion,
overruled cases that have involved the interpretation of a statute.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290, 298 (N.H.
1988) (overruling earlier New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling); Lubbock
County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002)
(overruling earlier Texas Supreme Court ruling).
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remedies all along.
Price fixers should not be allowed to retain their crimes’ spoils
while their victims remain uncompensated. Because virtually every
state’s antitrust (or consumer protection) laws provide consumers a
remedy for these crimes, consumers and attorneys general need to
begin testing and enforcing consumers’ rights. Our states’ antitrust
laws were enacted to address consumers’ indirect purchaser claims.
These laws, when coupled with considerations of natural justice
and society’s unwillingness to permit criminals to profit from their
crimes, implore the need, indeed the necessity, for enforcement.
In most states, consumers already pursue their indirect purchaser
rights, and it is now time that justice be pursued, and had, by all.
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